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Abstract: 
Drawing on the contributions of Augusto Graziani to the so-called monetary theory of 
production, this paper aims to show that an accommodative monetary policy ± as 
defended in the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) theory and supported by 
current practice around the world ± has the maximum effect in stimulating aggregate 
demand and income when it is implemented in conjunction with a coordinated 
discretionary fiscal policy that boosts the demand for and the supply of loans via the 
reduction of the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk. As a result, the potentially 
beneficial effects of the traditional Keynesian fiscal multiplier are significantly amplified. 
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1. Introduction 
The main tenet of the current dominant view in macroeconomics, the so-called New 
Consensus (NCM hereafter) theory, is that central banks, via changes in the nominal 
interest rate, are able to manage aggregate demand and current output in the short run 
(Arestis, 2009). During recessive phases of the business cycle, the conventional rule 
requires a reduction of the short-run nominal interest rate, with the objective of increasing 
consumption (and possibly, though indirectly, investment). At the same time, the NCM 
maintains that fiscal policies should be used for the control of public finances. 
Discretionary fiscal policies could destabilise the market economy, and hence be counter-
productive for long-run economic growth. 
This paper aims to challenge these policy recommendations by using the monetary 
theory of production (MTP hereafter; also often labelled the theory of the monetary 
circuit) in the version developed by Augusto Graziani (1987, 1989, 1996, 2003a and 
2003b; see also, for recent developments, Arena and Salvadori, 2004; Delaplace and Nell, 
1996; Fontana and Realfonzo 2005, 2015; Rochon and Rossi, 2003). The MTP has a long 
history. In addition to Keynes (1930, 1933), early statements of the MTP can be mainly 
found in Wicksell (1936 [orig. 1898], Ch. 9, Section B), Schumpeter (1934 [orig. 1912], 
Ch. 2), and Kalecki (1971). The MTP assumes a rigorous distinction between the core 
private macro agents of an economy, namely commercial banks, firms and workers. It 
describes the working of the economy as a sequential process, characterized by successive 
stages forming a monetary circuit. The circuit starts when banks finance the production 
plans of firms. In the simplest models, the amount of financing equals the wage bill. Once 
labour services have been purchased, firms carry out production plans, and then sell the 
output in the goods market. The monetary circuit closes when firms reimburse 
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commercial banks. The main tenets of the MTP are: 1) the money supply is endogenous, 
since loans are created by banks in response to creditworthy demand by firms; 2) the total 
levels of output and employment depend on the level of aggregate demand; 3) the 
distribution of income is not determined by the marginal theory of distribution (see, for a 
detailed discussion of these tenets, Fontana 2009a; Realfonzo 1998, 2006; see, also, 
Rochon, 1999). These three tenets will also be the guiding principles of the model 
presented in this paper.   
Graziani has always given a prominent role to macroeconomic policies in order to 
improve the economic performance of a country. For instance, Graziani (2003a) assigns 
to the central bank the important role of safeguarding the smoothing functioning of the 
banking system. In this way, the central bank could prevent an excessive expansion of 
credit that jeopardizes both the liquidity needs of lenders (banks) and the solvency 
requirements of borrowers (firms). Furthermore, by influencing the lending activities of 
commercial banks, the central bank could contain the risk of high inflationary pressures. 
As far as fiscal policy is concerned, Graziani has often maintained that government 
expenditure produces an increase of income, employment and monetary profits (e.g. 
Graziani 2003a, Sec 5.4).1 Similarly, another leading scholar of the MTP and close friend 
and colleague of Graziani, Alain Parguez (2008) has maintained that an expansionary 
ILVFDOSROLF\KDVWREHUHJDUGHGDVDQ³DQFKRU´RISURILWV, since a high level of government 
                                                          
1
 Some followers of Graziani and the MTP have further developed this argument that discretionary 
government expenditure contributes to the increase of profits and income. For in-stance, Forges 
'DYDQ]DWL3DFHOODDQG5HDOIRQ]RSDUJXHWKDW³DQLnitial increase in public expenditure 
>@FDQJHQHUDWHH[WUDSURILWVWRWKHEHQHILWRIILUPV'XHWRWKHLPSURYHPHQWLQDILUP¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV
WKLVOHDGVWRDQLQFUHDVHLQLQYHVWPHQWDQGRXWSXW´ 
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expenditure is associated with a high inflow of money into the goods markets (see, also, 
Parguez and Seccareccia, 2000). 
The main goal of this MTP-inspired paper is to build on these propositions and to show 
that an accommodative monetary policy ± as defended in the NCM theory and supported 
by current practice around the world ± has the maximum effect in stimulating aggregate 
demand and income when it is implemented with a discretionary fiscal policy that boosts 
- via the reduction of the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk ± the demand for and the 
supply of loans. As a result, the potentially beneficial effects of the traditional Keynesian 
fiscal multiplier are significantly amplified (Dalziel, 1996).  
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a critical assessment of the 
dominant New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) theory and its policy implications. 
Section 3 introduces the core features and assumptions of the model, together with a 
formal analysis of the loans market, where the difference between the insolvency risk and 
the liquidity risk faced by commercial banks is fully explored. Section 4 discusses the 
intimate link between the loans market and the equilibrium in the good market. It analyses 
in details the coordinated effects of a discretionary expansionary fiscal policy and an 
accommodative monetary policy that boosts - via the reduction of the liquidity risk and 
the insolvency risk ± the demand for and the supply of loans. Section 5 proposes a stock-
flow consistent representation of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The New Consensus Macroeconomics Theory and Policy Implications 
The New Consensus Macroeconomics theory is based on a core 3-equation model, 
namely an IS-type curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy rule. Fontana (2009b) 
and Arestis (2009), among others, have critically assessed the nature and origin of the 
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model and its policy implications. The model has several standard features of the New 
Keynesian approach to macroeconomics. All three equations can be derived from explicit 
optimising behaviour of individual agents in the presence of market failures, including 
imperfect competition, incomplete markets, and asymmetric information. These market 
failures generate transitory price and wage stickiness, which in turn gives support to the 
view that in the short run the aggregate supply responds to changes in the aggregate 
demand. Aggregate demand has thus a transitory, yet non-trivial role in determining the 
equilibrium level of output and employment in the economy. In other words, where 
individual agents behave rationally, due to market failures the outcome of their actions 
has adverse macroeconomic effects. On this basis, macroeconomic policies are then 
justified to eliminate or limit some of these effects.  
In terms of the mechanics of the core model, price and wage stickiness plays a key role 
in relating the monetary policy rule to the IS-type curve. The central bank via changes in 
the short-run nominal interest rate is actually able to control the short-run real interest 
rate. In this way, the central bank is able to directly affect the consumption component of 
aggregate demand, and hence the current level of output. This is an important theoretical 
result, because it goes well with another important tenet of the NCM model, namely that 
low and stable inflation is conducive to growth, stability and the efficient functioning of 
market. When the economy is hit by shocks, taking it away from its natural path, the 
central bank is responsible for achieving the desired rate of inflation in the long run, and 
subject to that, also for bringing output and employment to their equilibrium levels in the 
short run. However, in pursuit of its objectives the central bank faces a short-run trade-
off between inflation and output. This trade-off is captured by the Phillips curve, which 
can be thought as the aggregate supply component of the NCM model. 
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Over the past decade the NCM theory has received several criticisms. Some of these 
criticisms originate from economists who have contributed to its creation and 
development. For instance, Blanchard (2016; see also 2008) assesses current dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which are grounded on the NCM theory, 
and the role that they play in current macroeconomic research and policy making. He 
maintains that current DSGE models are based on assumptions which are poorly 
supported by empirical evidence. They are seriously flawed descriptions of the behaviour 
of consumers and price and wage setters in the real world. Similarly, he founds 
unconvincing the mix of calibration and Bayesian estimation methods utilised to estimate 
DSGE models, or the use of DSGE models for normative purposes. These are internal 
critiques of the NCM theory and its policy implications. As a result of them, many 
macroeconomists are now working on various ways to amend the NCM theory, possibly 
adding more realism to its core equations (see, for instance, Linde et al., 2016). 
Other criticisms of the NCM theory and policy implications originate from economists 
that have been sceptical of recent theoretical and empirical contributions. These 
economists show appreciation for some features of NCM, including the rejection of the 
monetarist hypothesis that the central bank is able to control monetary aggregates. Yet, 
they reject some of the core features of the NCM theory, which are considered a 
dangerous dead end. These are external critiques of NCM and its policy implications. 
This paper is part of this tradition in that it rejects the so-called transversality condition 
of the NCM theory, and it challenges its main policy implication, namely the current 
³FRQVHQVXVDVVLJQPHQW´RQWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQPRQHWDU\DQGILVFDOSROLFLHV 
The transversality condition is a restriction that describes the optimal paths of dynamic 
economic models (Kamihigashi, 2006). In the NCM core model it means that credit and 
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default risks are removed, such that all debts are always paid in full. This makes the NCM 
core model essentially non-monetary, with no meaningful role for banks, liquidity or 
solvency constraints. Therefore, one of the main features of real world economies, namely 
the nature of money as an indirect debit-credit relationship, is conspicuously ignored.2 
Any IOU is and will be accepted in exchange for goods and services in the NCM core 
model. In other words, there is no need for money in the model (Arestis, 2014, pp. 5-10). 
The main implication of the NCM theory is that monetary policy has been upgraded 
as the most powerful macroeconomic instrument in the hands of the government. The 
central bank via interest rate manipulation is in charge of achieving the desired inflation 
target, and subject to that to deliver as much output stabilisation as possible in the short 
run. By contrast, drawing on the so-called Ricardian equivalence theory and controversial 
interpretations of historical evidence, fiscal policy is limited to the control and 
sustainability of public finances. This had led to a so-FDOOHG³FRQVHQVXVDVVLJQPHQW´RQ
the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies: 
The consensus assignment from the title refers to the idea that monetary policy (in a closed 
economy, or a small open economy with flexible exchange rates) should normally focus on 
business cycle stabilisation and inflation control, while fiscal policy (at the macro level) 
should focus on the control of government debt or deficits (Kirsanova et al., 2009, F482). 
This paper rejects the transversality condition, and it challenges the current dominant 
consensus assignment. It aims to show that: (a) banks, liquidity and solvency constraints 
do matter; and (b) monetary policy has the maximum effect in stimulating aggregate 
demand and income when it is implemented with a coordinated discretionary fiscal policy 
                                                          
2
 See, for an historical analysis of the role of money and banking in different theoretical frameworks, 
Realfonzo (1998).  
  
8 
 
that boosts the demand for and the supply of loans, via the reduction of the liquidity risk 
and the insolvency risk.3 
A word of caution is important here about the contribution of this paper vis-à-vis the 
NCM theory and policy implications. Building on the MTP, the case could be made that 
the current role played by monetary policy in the NCM is unwarranted, and that fiscal 
policy should be the main macroeconomic policy. The case could rest on the following 
two reasons. First, fiscal policy could be used at least as efficiently as monetary policy 
for a variety of goals, including high levels of income and employment, and price stability 
(Fontana, 2009b; Forges Davanzati, Pacella and Realfonzo 2009). Secondly, changes in 
the short-run nominal interest rate set by the central bank may not always translate in 
changes in the interest rate on loans, which in turn may not always lead to changes in 
aggregate demand and income, i.e. the NCM view of monetary policy is too mechanistic 
(Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007).  
Whatever the merit of the proposal of replacing monetary policy with fiscal policy as 
the main macroeconomic policy, this paper has a different objective. It aims to analyse 
how fiscal policy could conveniently interact with the monetary transmission mechanism 
in order to achieve high levels of income, while upholding the emphasis of the NCM on 
monetary policy and current policy making around the world. In order to understand this 
point, it must be stressed that the aggregate demand may not be significantly affected by 
changes in the short nominal interest rate set by the central bank as long as the demand 
for loans and the supply of loans do not change. Therefore, the factors influencing the 
                                                          
3
 See, on the role of the aggregate banking system (i.e. commercial banks and the central bank) and fiscal 
authorities in the Keynesian multiplier process, Kahn (1931, pp. 174-175), Trevithick (1994, p. 78), and 
more recently Rochon (2014). 
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demand for and the supply of loans play an important role in the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy. Then, the argument advanced in this paper is that fiscal policy can 
influence these factors, and hence interact purposefully with monetary policy in order to 
achieve high levels of aggregate demand and income. 
There are different factors influencing the supply of loans. Building on the MTP, this 
paper gives priority to the role of mark-ups in the money supply process.4 Commercial 
banks set the interest rate on loans as a mark-up on the short-run nominal interest rate set 
by the central bank. Therefore, the mark-up plays an important role in transmitting the 
interest rate policy changes of the central bank to the economy (Lavoie, 1984, 2014; 
Moore, 1988; Fontana, 2009a). For instance, if the central bank reduces the short-run 
nominal interest rate with the purpose of stimulating bank lending and hence interest rate 
sensitive components of aggregate demand, commercial banks may respond to this policy 
by increasing the mark-up, and in this way they may thwart the efforts of the central bank. 
The mark-up thus performs a strategic function in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy (Fontana and Setterfield, 2009). Importantly, the mark-up depends on 
the credit risks, namely the insolvency and liquidity risks. Discretionary government 
spending policies financed by borrowing from the central bank in conjunction with an 
accommodative monetary policy can contribute to reduce those risks. In order to reduce 
the credit risks, in fact, the central bank can exchange relatively liquid assets (represented 
by government bonds) with comparatively illiquid assets (private debt held by banks as 
                                                          
4
 Alternatively, the focus could be on the creditworthiness status of borrowers (Wolfson, 1996). Lavoie 
(2004, pp. 143-144) analyses the role of the creditworthiness status of borrowers in a stock-flow 
consistent representation of MTP.  In this paper, the creditworthiness status of borrowers is represented 
E\WKHSDUDPHWHUȖZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIGHVLUHGORDQVWKDWDUHGHHPHGFUHGLWZRUWK\E\
banks, and it is left into the background of the analysis. 
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result of their lending activity). By doing this, the central bank helps to make the portfolio 
of commercial banks more liquid, and hence ceteris paribus this encourages banks to 
increase the supply of loans in order to accommodate any unsatisfied demand for loans. 
However, this policy on its own may not produce the expected results, as long as the 
demand for loans is not stimulated. In addition to provide government bonds to the central 
bank, which can then be exchanged for private assets held by banks, discretionary 
government spending policies are an important tool in influencing the demand for loans. 
A discretionary fiscal policy is likely to increase aggregate demand and income, and 
hence it stimulates the demand for loans and the amount of private resources that 
borrowers can devote to the reimbursement of their debts. 
 
3. An MTP-inspired Model 
3.1 Main Features and Assumptions 
The model presented in this paper includes a private sector and a government sector. 
The private sector comprises workers, firms and commercial banks (banks, for short). 
The government sector is made of the treasury and the central bank. The economy is 
closed and produces one commodity, which is used both as a consumption and investment 
good. Government bonds B and private bank debts D of firms are the only financial assets 
traded in the economy. 
Firms finance the production process by borrowing from banks. The total amount of 
bank loans L is negotiated between banks and firms, and is influenced by the expected 
level of aggregate demand ADe and the loans rate i. Firms fix the price p of the only 
commodity produced as a mark-up on the unit labour cost. Furthermore, firms use a 
portion W of their profits 3F to fund their investments I. 
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On their part, banks set the interest rate on loans (the loans rate, for short) i as a mark-
up on the short-run nominal interest rate iCB set by the central bank. This means that the 
loans rate increases when the short-run nominal interest rate iCB increases, and/or when 
the mark-up set by banks increases. The mark-up depends positively on the credit risks D?஼ோ, which in turn depend positively on the liquidity risk D?௅ and the insolvency risk D?ூ. 
The liquidity risk is the risk that banks may not be able to meet their obligations as they 
become due. The insolvency risk is a measure of bad loans. It concerns the possibility 
that firms do not reimburse, totally or partially, their bank debts. 
IQOLQHZLWK*UD]LDQL¶VWKHRU\DQGKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHUROHRIPRQH\LQWKHGeneral 
Theory of Keynes (Keynes, 1936), it is also assumed that in normal circumstances firms 
are indebted to banks (Graziani, 2003a, 69-71). In analytical terms, this means that the 
equilibrium condition of firms in a monetary economy in stationary conditions is 
associated with the existence of a constant amount of bank debt. Therefore, the analysis 
below starts with a cumulated amount of private bank debts D of firms. 
The treasury is in charge of government expenditure, while for the sake of simplicity 
taxes are ignored.5 The treasury finances government expenditure G by borrowing from 
the central bank. The treasury obtains high powered money H from the central bank in 
                                                          
5
 More realistically, the treasury could either change government purchases (for consumption or investment 
purposes) and/or change taxes (lump sum or distortionary taxes like labour, corporate and value-added 
taxes) net of transfer. The NCM literature focuses on government purchases for the simple reason that 
modern Inflation Targeting (IT) central banks have historically changed their policy rate, namely the 
short-run nominal interest rate, when fiscal policy is accomplished mainly through changes in 
government purchases rather than changes in taxes. The main reason for this preference is that central 
banks interpret the former as a signal of a stronger commitment to fiscal (in)discipline (see, for instance, 
IMF 2010, pp. 102-105). Consistently with the NCM literature, this paper focuses on government 
purchases rather than taxes. 
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exchange for government bonds B. In turn, with the purpose of increasing the liquidity 
portfolio of banks, the central bank transfers part of the government bonds to banks in 
exchange for some of their accumulated stock of private bank debts D of firms. For the 
sake of simplicity the interest rate on government bonds is nil.  
Finally, the model operates within a Hicksian single period analysis (Fontana, 2004), 
i.e. it is based on the simplifying assumption that within the period considered all 
macroeconomics agents hold constant expectations. This assumption helps to interpret 
real causal structures as temporally stable, though not inherently predictable, and in this 
way it aids to detect the mechanisms and tendencies regulating actual events. For the 
purpose of this paper, this means that the single period analysis of the co-ordinated effects 
of an accommodative monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy will continue for a 
sufficiently long period of time for the outcome of the lending process of banks triggered 
by the production decisions of firms to become apparent, or, what is the same thing, for 
the effects of the creation of money on aggregate demand, and income to be revealed 
(Fontana, 2009a, pp.78-84). 
 
3.2 A Formal Analysis of the Loans Market 
The core of the model is represented by the loans market, its role in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, and the way discretionary fiscal policy can purposefully 
interact with it, in order to achieve high levels of aggregate demand, income, and 
employment. The rest of this section presents a formal analysis of the loans market, 
starting with the set of equations for the loans rate, the demand for and the supply of 
loans. 
  
13 
 
The loans rate i is set by banks as a mark-up on the central bank rate iCB, with the mark-
up being determined among other things by the credit risks D?஼ோ, namely the weighted 
mean between the liquidity risk D?௅ and the insolvency risk D?ூ:  D? ൌ D?஼஻ሺ ? ൅ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵD?஼ோሻ ൌ D?஼஻ሼ ? ൅ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵሾID?௅ ൅ ሺ ? െIሻD?ூሿሽ     [1] 
where 0P is the mark-up depending on the degree of concentration of the banking sector, 
1P  is the marginal mark-up on the credit risks, I and (1-I) are the weights assigned by 
banks to the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk, respectively.  
Equations [2] and [3] below define the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk, 
respectively. The liquidity risk D?௅ is measured by the illiquid assets D to the own funds 
OF (equity capital of banks) ratio (Lavoie, 2014, p. 198). The insolvency risk D?ூ is 
determined by the bank debts D to the income Y ratio of firms. D?௅஽ாி ؠ ஽ைி          [2] D?ூ஽ாி ؠ ஽௒           [3] 
The coordinated effects of the discretionary fiscal policy and accommodative 
monetary policy described above has the potential of lowering both the liquidity risk and 
the insolvency risk. 
Equation [2a] and Equation [3a] below shows the effects on the liquidity risk and the 
insolvency risk of the coordinated discretionary fiscal policy and accommodative 
monetary policy: D?௅ ൌ ஽ିఠభ஻ைி           [2a] D?ூ ൌ ஽ା௅௒೐            [3a] 
Since discretionary fiscal policy has a direct and immediate effect on aggregate 
demand, an increase in government expenditure G has a positive effect on the income of 
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firms. In addition to this, an increase in government expenditure G has a dual positive 
effect in the credit market, encouraging both the demand for and the supply of loans. 
Starting with the former, at the beginning of the period when the treasury increases 
government expenditure G by exchanging government bonds B for high powered money 
H with the central bank, firms expect an increase in the sales of their commodity. As a 
result, firms increase the demand for loans, since they need to pay workers before the 
production process can start. In the described circumstances, banks are more likely to 
satisfy this increasing demand for loans: as long as the value of the new expected income 
Ye lower the insolvency risk more than the new cost of loans L increase it, the capacity of 
firms to reimburse banks debts improves. The formal condition for this outcome can be 
derived from Equation [3a] as follows: D?D?ூ ൌ D?D?ூD?D?௘ D?D?௘ ൅ D?D?ூD?D?D?D? ൌ െD? ൅ D?ሺD?௘ሻଶ D?D?௘ ൅ D?D?D?௘ ൏  ? ௗ௒೐ௗ௅ ൐ ௒೐஽ା௅          ሾ ?ሿ 
Equation [3b] above derives the formal condition for a reduction in the insolvency risk 
ratio expected by banks to hold true in Equation [3a].  
Furthermore, when the central bank transfers a portion Z1 of B to banks in exchange 
for Z2 of their accumulated stock of private debt D, banks are more likely to increase the 
supply of loans: as long as government bonds are deemed to be more liquid than private 
bank debts, the accommodative policy of the central bank raises the liquidity portfolio of 
banks. In other words, banks face a lower liquidity risk when making new loans. 
Substituting Equation [2a] and Equation [3a] into Equation [1], the loan rate is defined 
as follows: D? ൌ D?஼஻ ቂ ? ൅ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵ ቀI ஽ିఠభ஻ைி ൅ ሺ ? െIሻ ஽ା௅௒೐ ቁቃ     [4] 
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Equation [4] shows that the loans rate decreases if ceteris paribus the credit risks faced 
by banks decrease. 
Equation [5] below shows that the notional or desired demand for loans at the 
beginning of the period depends positively on the expected aggregate demand ADe and 
negatively on the loans rate i: D?ௗ ൌ D? ൅ D?D?D?௘ െ D㼇?        [5] 
where D? ൐  ? is the autonomous component of the demand for loans, and b ൐  ?, and D? ൐ ?. 
However banks are only concerned with creditworthy borrowers. Then, Equation [5a] 
below shows the effective or actual GHPDQGIRUORDQVZKHUHȖUHSUHVHQWWKHSURSRUWLRQ
of notional loans that are deemed creditworthy by banks.  D?ௗ ൌ D?ሺD? ൅ D?D?D?௘ െ D㼇?ሻ        [5a] 
where 0൏Ȗ൑  ?. 
The supply of loans sL is a perfectly elastic line at the loans rate fixed by banks at the 
beginning of the period (Moore, 1988; Fontana, 2009, Ch. 5). Given the demand for and 
the supply of loans, the total amount of loans actually created is equal to the wage bill 
wN, which is necessary in order to hire workers and make effective the production plans 
of creditworthy firms: D?D?ൌ D?ሺD? ൅D?D?௘ሻ െ D?D?D?஼஻ ቂ ? ൅ D?଴ ൅ D?ଵ ቀI ஽ିఠభ஻ைி ൅ ሺ ? െIሻ ஽ା௅௒೐ ቁቃ  [6] 
Equation [6] shows that the wage bill is influenced among other things by the expected 
aggregate demand, the proportion of loans that are deemed creditworthy, the short-run 
nominal interest rate set by the central bank, and the liquidity and insolvency risks. 
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4. Loans Market, Good Market and the Super Multiplier 
The loans market presented in the previous Section is intimately connected to the 
goods market via the effects of the loans rate, and the liquidity and insolvency risks on 
aggregate demand and income.6 Coordinated fiscal and monetary policies can purposely 
interact in order to influence these variables, and achieve high levels of aggregate demand 
and income. This Section derives the income and related expenditures of workers, banks 
and firms, together with the equilibrium in the good market between aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply, before exploring through a graphical analysis the coordinated 
effects of the discretionary fiscal policy and accommodative monetary policy. 
The total level of output produced is equal to D?D?D?, where p, S, and N indicate the price 
of the commodity, the productivity of workers and the level of employment, respectively.  
Firms set p as a mark-up H on the unit labour costs, namely D? ൌ௪గ ሺ ? ൅ D?ሻ, where w is the 
nominal wage. Therefore, the total level of output produced is as follows: D? ൌD?D?ሺ ൅ D?ሻ          [7] 
Equation [8] below shows the wage bill, i.e. the income of workers: D?D?ൌ ௒ଵାఌ          [8] 
The profits of banks are determined by the difference between revenues and costs. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that banks do not have costs, i.e. there are no costs for equipment 
and for paying wages and salaries to their employees, and the interest rate on bank 
                                                          
6
 The parameter Ȗ representing the proportion of notional loans that are deemed creditworthy by banks is 
another key variable linking the loans market to the goods market. The analysis of the effects of the 
parameter Ȗ on aggregate demand and income is not pursued in this paper, and left to future studies. 
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deposits is nil.7 It follows that the profits of banks correspond to the repayments of the 
interest rate on the loans L and on the accumulated private debts D by firms: 
3஻ ൌ D?D?൅ D?D?ൌ D? ቀD? ൅௒ଵାఌቁ       [9] 
The profits of firms are again determined by the difference between revenues and 
costs. In the simple model presented here, the costs of firms are equal to the wage bill ቀ ௒ଵାఌቁ, and the interests paid on both the initial stock of debt outstanding D, and the new 
loans L. The revenues are represented by the consumption of workers C, the expenditure 
of banks R, the government expenditure G, and the investments of firms I. It follows that 
the profits of firms are as follows: 
3ி ൌ D? ൅ D? ൅ D? ൅ D? െ௒ଵାఌ െ D? ቀD? ൅௒ଵାఌቁ      [10] 
From equation [8], the consumption of workers C is derived as follows: D? ൌ D?ௐD?D?          [11] 
where DW is the marginal propensity to consume of workers, with  ? ൏ Ƚௐ ൑  ?. 
Similarly, from equation [9] the expenditure of banks in the current period is equal to: D? ൌ D?஻ሺD?D?ሻ          [12] 
Equation [12] shows that the expenditure of banks depends on the marginal propensity 
to consume of banks DB, with  ? ൏ Ƚ஻ ൑  ?, and the repayment of interest rates on the 
accumulated private debts. The repayment of the interest rate on loans L by firms accrues 
                                                          
7
 In order to keep the model as simple as possible, when calculating the equilibrium in the good market 
(Equation [16]), it is assumed that in the current period workers spend all of their income, which 
amounts to say that there are no additional bank deposits, and therefore the interest rate on additional 
deposits is redundant once the production process is completed.  
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to the income of banks in the current period, but it is assumed they are not spent, and 
increase the own funds of banks. This is consistent with the definition of the monetary 
FLUFXLW RIIHUHG E\ *UD]LDQL ³RQFH WKH LQLWLDO EDQN GHEW LV UHSDLG DQG WKH PRQH\ LV
GHVWUR\HGWKHPRQHWDU\FLUFXLWLVFORVHG´*UD]LDQLa, p. 30; see, Zezza (2012), for 
a different interpretation8). 
Equations [13a]-[13b] shows that firms plan to invest a portion W of their expected 
profits ሺ3ி௘ ሻ9and use the excess of realised profits (3) over investment in order to pay 
back a share E1 of their accumulated private debts D, with  ? ൏ ɒ ൏  ? and  ? ൑ Ⱦଵ ൏  ?ǣ10 D? ൌሺD?ሻ3ி௘           [13a] D?ଵD? ൌ3ி െ D?         [13b] 
In the rest of the paper, it is assumed that expected profits 3ி௘  are equal to realised 
profits 3F. Given the above relationships, Equation [14] and Equation [15] below shows 
                                                          
8
 Zezza (2012, p. 164) argues that interest payments on loans constitute a source of income for banks, and 
hence an additional source of either the demand for goods or for financial assets. This is undeniable. 
But, consistently with the monetary circuit theory, this papers maintains that the repayment of the 
interest rate on loans is an additional source of the demand for goods (financial assets are ignored in 
this paper) for the next monetary circuit, rather than the current monetary circuit. By contrast, the 
repayment of the interests on the accumulated private debts D is a source of additional demand for goods 
in the current period. 
9
 MonetaU\FLUFXLWWKHRULVWVGLVWLQJXLVKWKH¿QDQFLQJRIWKHHQWLUHSURGXFWLRQSODQVIRUERWKFRQVXPSWLRQ
and capital goods, the so-called initial finance, from the purchase of capital goods, the so-called final 
finance or funding of investment (Graziani, 2003, p. 56, pp. 69-74; see, also on this distinction, Chick, 
1995, pp. 30-31; Davidson, 1982, p. 49; Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 50): i.e. monetary circuit theorists 
related the funding of gross investment to realised corporate profits (Graziani, 2003, p. 71-74), what are 
also labelled the retained earnings of corporations. 
10
 The paper assumes that  ? ൑ Ⱦଵ ൏  ?. This is consistent with the standard circuitist proposition that in 
normal circumstances firms are indebted to banks (Graziani, 2003, 69-71; see, also, discussion in 
Section 3.1).  
  
19 
 
the equation for the aggregate demand, and the equilibrium in the good market, 
respectively: D?D?ൌ D? ൅ D? ൅ D? ൅ D? ൌ ௒ሾఈೈିఛሺଵା௜ሻሿሺଵାఌሻሺଵିఛሻ ൅ ீି஽௜ሺఛିఈಳሻଵିఛ     [14] D?ா ൌ ଵାఌሺଵାఌሻሺଵିఛሻିఈೈାఛሺଵା௜ሻ ሾD? െD?D?ሺ െ D?஻ሻሿ     [15] 
Equation [16] below shows the equilibrium in the good market. It is derived under few 
simplifying assumptions. First, it is assumed that firms plan to invest the full amount of 
their expected profits, i.e. D? ൌ  ?. As a result, Ⱦଵ ൌ  ?, i.e. the repayment of previously 
accumulated private debts D is postponed to future periods. Furthermore, for simplicity 
it is also assumed that the marginal propensity to consume of workers and of banks are 
all equal to one (D?ௐ ൌ  ?ǢD?஻ ൌ  ?ሻ: D?ா ൌ ଵାఌ௜ ሺD?ሻ         [16] 
Among other things, Equation [16] indicates that there is a direct relationship between 
government expenditure, and the equilibrium level of income in the good market. 
Furthermore, the loans rate affects the value of the multiplier: the higher the loans rate, 
the lower is the multiplier. 
Equation [17] below is derived by substituting Equation [4] into Equation [16]. Among 
other things, and under the few simplifying assumptions discussed above, it makes 
explicit that the equilibrium in the good market is also affected by the short-run nominal 
interest rate set by the central bank, and the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk faced 
by banks. D?ଵா ൌ ଵାఌ௜಴ಳቂଵାఓబାఓభቀIವషഘభಳೀಷ ାሺଵିIሻವశಽೊ೐ ቁቃ ሺD?ሻ      [17] 
Equation [17] confirms that an accommodative monetary policy ± as defended in the 
NCM theory and supported by current practice around the world ± has the maximum 
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effect in stimulating aggregate demand and income, when it is implemented with a 
discretionary fiscal policy that boosts the demand for and the supply of loans, through the 
reduction of the liquidity risk and the insolvency risk. As a result of it, the potentially 
beneficial effects of the traditional Keynesian fiscal multiplier are significantly amplified, 
potentially giving rise to a super multiplier of government expenditure. 
Figure 1 below is a two-panel diagram representing the loans market and the good 
market. It shows the coordinated effects of the expansionary fiscal policy and the 
accommodative monetary policy. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 
The upper panel portrays the loans market. The supply of loans is represented by a 
perfectly elastic line at the loans rate set by banks. The effective demand for loans is 
represented by a decreasing linear function of the loans rate. It shifts in response to change 
in the expected aggregate demand ADe, and in the parameter Ȗ representing the proportion 
of notional loans that are deemed creditworthy by banks. The effective demand for and 
the supply of loans determine the total volume of credit, which allows firms to secure the 
labour services from workers and to produce the only commodity, which is used both as 
a consumption and investment good. The lower panel portrays the level of income as a 
function of bank loans. 
The initial level of income is supposed to be Y1. This level of output is financed by the 
volume of loans L1 (point A). An increase in government expenditure G has a positive 
effect on the expected aggregate demand, and hence the demand for loans shifts 
rightwards. Furthermore, when the treasury increases government expenditure, firms 
expect an increase in the sales of their good. Since firms need loans in order to pay 
workers before the production of the good can start, they increase the demand for loans. 
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Given the circumstances, banks are likely to satisfy the rising demand, i.e. banks revise 
downwards their assessment of the insolvency risk of firms. The demand for loans shifts 
further rightwards. Figure 1 shows the final effect of these shifts: the demand for loans 
moves from D?ଵௗ  to D?ଶௗ.  
Furthermore, the coordinated accommodative monetary policy has a positive effect on 
the liquidity risk, and, ceteris paribus, on the supply of loans. The treasury finances 
government expenditure by exchanging government bonds for high powered money with 
the central bank, which in turn, then swaps government bonds for some of the initial 
accumulated stock of private debt held by banks. As a result, banks revise downwards 
their assessment of the liquidity risk, and the loans rate is reduced from i1 to i2. Figure 1 
shows that the supply of credit shifts downwards from D?ଵௌ  to D?ଶௌ , and the new volume of 
loans is L2 (point B). The new and higher level of output in the good market is Y2. 
 
5. A Stock-Flow Consistent Representation of the Model 
This section presents the transaction flow matrices of the analysis proposed above 
together with a simplified sectoral balance sheet matrix. Transaction flow matrices are 
the backbone of the increasingly popular stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach to 
macroeconomics (Lavoie, 2004; Godley and Lavoie, 2007). Transaction flow matrices tie 
together real decisions with monetary and financial consequences, providing a 
comprehensive and coherent account of the model.  
The golden rule of the transaction flow matrices is that all the rows and all the columns 
must sum to zero. Rows represent the flows of transactions for each asset or activity, 
whereas columns represent the budget constraint of each sector, namely workers, firms, 
banks, the central bank and the treasury. For each sector, sources of funds take a positive 
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sign, and uses of funds take a negative sign. For instance, the proceeds of a sale or the 
receipts of a PRQHWDU\ÀRZare an inflow, hence they take a positive sign. By contrast, 
the purchase of a commodity or the acquisition of high-powered money or bank deposits 
are an outflow, and they take a minus sign. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLES 1-2 
Tables 1-2 describe the coordinated effects of the discretionary fiscal policy and the 
accommodative monetary policy, respectively. In Table 1, the treasury sells bonds to the 
central bank (+'B) in exchange for high-powered money (-'H). Then, Table 2 above 
shows that the central bank exchanges Z1 amount of government bonds B for Z2 amount 
of accumulated private debts D with banks. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLES 3-4 
Table 3 above represents the first step of the money creation process in the loans 
market, as in the traditional monetary theory of production (e.g. Godley and Lavoie, 2007, 
pp. 47-49). Firms borrow (L)11 from banks, and as a result an equivalent amount of 
deposits (-'ML) are created. Table 3 clearly illustrates what in the SFC approach is 
labelled a quadruple-entry system. Since the golden rule of the transaction flow matrix 
holds all the time, a change in one component of the table entails a change in other three 
components.  
Table 4 shows the second step of the traditional money creation process. Firms pay the 
wage fund (-wN) to workers in exchanges for their labour services, and as a result firms 
                                                          
11 In the SFC modelling literature, flow variables are indicated with the sign '. However, consistently with 
the use in previous sections of the paper, L indicates the flow of bank loans and no use of the sign ' is 
made for this variable.  
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transfer the ownership of their bank deposits (+'ML) to workers. The production process 
is then realised. However, at this stage the produced good is still unsold, hence for firms 
it appears as both an increase in the inventories (+I in the current account) and an 
acquisition of capital (-I in the capital account). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 
Tables 5 and 6 represent the final steps of the analysis. Table 5 above shows what 
happens to the total amount of output produced. Workers spend their wages to buy the 
commodity (-C), and as a result they transfer the ownership of bank deposits (+'MC) to 
firms. The treasury executes the government expenditure G. It pays firms by drawing 
cheques on its account, which once cashed at the banks (+'MG and -'H), they create an 
equal amount of bank deposits (-'MG) for firms. Firms repay E1 amount of accumulated 
private debts D (-E1D) and interest rates iD (-INTB) to banks, and accordingly there is a 
corresponding change in the ownership of bank deposits (+'MD). Banks spend the earned 
interest rates to buy the commodity (-R), with a consequent transfer the ownership of 
bank deposits (+'MR) to firms. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 
Table 6 above represents the closure of the single period monetary circuit analysis. 
Firms repay loans (-L) and related interest rates (-INTL) to banks, and as a result the 
ownership of an equivalent amount of deposits (+'MLL) is transferred to banks. 
Finally, Table 7 below presents a simplified sectoral balance sheet matrix (Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007, pp. 31-32). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 
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The simplified sectoral balance sheet matrix follows the same golden rule of the 
transaction flow matrices, namely that all the rows and all the columns must sum to zero, 
with the exception of the first row dealing with tangible capital. The actual stock of 
machines and inventories accumulated in the economy KF appears in a single entry of the 
sectoral balance sheet of their owners, i.e. firms. Similarly, the net worth of the economy 
as represented by the penultimate row is equal to the value of tangible capital KF,  
 
6. Conclusions 
The NCM theory maintains that monetary policy, namely changes in the short-run 
nominal interest rate set by the central bank, affects aggregate demand and income in the 
short run. Drawing on the contributions of Augusto Graziani to the so-called monetary 
theory of production (MTP), this paper has argued that monetary policy does not affect 
significantly aggregate demand as long as the demand for loans and the supply of loans 
do not change. Therefore, the factors influencing the loans market play an important role 
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Commercial banks set the loans rate as a mark-up on the short-run nominal interest 
rate set by the central bank. This mark-up is a measure of the credit risks, namely the 
insolvency risk and the liquidity risk faced by banks for their lending activities to firms. 
The paper has shown that a deficit spending policy by the government financed by 
borrowing from the central bank contribute to reduce the credit risks, and hence the mark-
up on the short-run nominal interest rate. In this way, the treasury and the central bank 
help to increase both the demand for and the supply of loans. As a result of this mix of 
expansionary fiscal policy and accommodative monetary policy, the traditional 
Keynesian deficit spending multiplier is significantly amplified, potentially giving rise to 
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a super multiplier of government expenditure, with high levels of aggregate demand and 
income. 
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Figure 1: The Coordinated Effects of the Expansionary Fiscal Policy and Accommodative Monetary Policy 
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Wages +wN -wN    0 
ȴ>ŽĂŶƐ  +L -L   0 
Loans inter.       
ȴĞƉŽƐŝƚƐ -ȴDL A?ȴDC -ȴDG -ȴDC    
A?ȴDD -ȴDR  
A?ȴDGA?ȴDL 
 ?ȴDDA?ȴDR 
  0 
ȴ,   -ȴ, A?ȴ, -ȴ,A?ȴ, 0 
ȴ'Žǀ ?ŽŶĚƐ   -Z1B -ȴA?Z1B A?ȴ 0 
ȴĐĐWƌŝǀĞď  -E1D +Z2D +E1D -Z2D  0 
AccPrivDeb inter.  ±INTB +INTB   0 
A? 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5: The commodity is sold 
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 Workers Firms Banks Central Bank Treasury A? 
Consumption -C +C    0 
Investment  +I -I    0 
Banks expend.  +R -R   0 
Gov. expend.  +G   -G 0 
Wages +wN -wN    0 
Firms Net Profits  +3UN -3UN    0 
ȴ>ŽĂŶƐ  +L -L -L +L   0 
Loans inter.  -INTL +INTL   0 
ȴĞƉŽƐŝƚƐ -ȴDL A?ȴDC -ȴDG -ȴDC    
A?ȴDD -ȴDR 
A?ȴDLL  
A?ȴDGA?ȴDL 
 ?ȴDDA?ȴDR 
-ȴDLL 
  0 
ȴ,   -ȴ, A?ȴ,  0 
ȴ'Žǀ ?ŽŶĚƐ   -Z1B -ȴA?Z1B A?ȴ 0 
ȴĐĐWƌŝǀĞď  -E1D +Z2D +E1D -Z2D  0 
AccPrivDeb inter.  ±INTB +INTB   0 
A? 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 6: The closure of the single period monetary analysis 
 
 Workers Firms Banks Central Bank Treasury A? 
Tangible Capital  +KF    +KF 
Firms debt  -D +DB +DCB  0 
Reserves   +H -H  0 
Deposits +MD  -MD   0 
Gov. bonds   +BB +BCB -B 0 
Banks own funds +OF  -OF   0 
Net worth -NWW -NWF -NWB 0 -NWT -KF 
A? 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 7: A simplified sectoral balance sheet matrix 
 
 
